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State Labs of Federalism and Law
Enforcement “Drone” Use
Chris Jenks
It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a
single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a
laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments
without risk to the rest of the country. This Court has the power
to prevent an experiment. We may strike down the statute
which embodies it on the ground that, in our opinion, the
measure is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. 1
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I. Introduction

By early 2015, fourteen U.S. states had enacted laws that
circumscribe law enforcement use of unmanned aerial systems
(UAS), otherwise known as drones.2 The legislation runs the
gamut of permissive to restrictive and even utilizes different terms
for the same object of regulation, UAS.3 These laws are the
2. See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, ROBOCOPS: FROM PHONES
DRONES 1 (2014), http://www.ncsl.org/documents/cj/RobocopsHandout.pdf
(listing Alaska, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Montana, North
Carolina, Oregon, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, and Wisconsin). In California, law
enforcement use UAS and in 2011 the Governor vetoed a bill which would have
required a warrant for any use except in cases of environmental emergencies. See
Phil Willon & Melanie Mason, Governor Vetoes Bill That Would Have Limited
Police Use of Drones, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/
local/political/la-me-ln-governor-vetoes-bill-to-limit-police-use-of-drones-201409
28-story.html (last visited June 1, 2015) (explaining the Governor’s motivation for
rejecting the bill and the reactions to his veto) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review). And in the summer of 2015, state laws regulating law
enforcement UAS use went into effect first in Virginia and then North Dakota.
See Andrea Noble, Drones Cleared for Takeoff in Virginia, But Law Enforcement
Agencies Aren’t Ready, USA TODAY (June 30, 2015), http://www.washingtontimes.
com/news/2015/jun/30/drones-cleared-for-takeoff-in-virginia-but-law-enf/?page=all
(last visited Aug. 30, 2015) [hereinafter Virginia] (describing the June 30, 2015
end of Virginia’s moratorium on law enforcement UAS use, beginning July 1,
Virginia law enforcement may utilize UAS pursuant to the terms of a warrant or
in case of specified emergency conditions including search and rescue and disaster
assistance) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Jeff Ward-Bailey,
North Dakota Becomes First State to Legalize Weaponized Police Drones,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Aug. 27, 2015) http://www.csmonitor.com/Technology/
2015/0827/North-Dakota-becomes-first-state-to-legalize-weaponized-police-drones
(last visited Aug. 30, 2015) [hereinafter North Dakota] (discussing North Dakota’s
law regulating law enforcement UAS use, which took effect August 1, 2015 and
authorizes use subject to a warrant or in accordance with exceptions to warrant
requirements) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). This Article
was substantively completed prior to when the Virginia and North Dakota laws
took effect.
3. See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 2, at 1
TO
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confused and, at times, even contradictory, extension of societal
views, perhaps most succinctly exemplified in early 2013.
In February 2013, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
released a list of eighty-one entities that had applied for a license
to operate UAS within the United States.4 The list included some
thirty-six colleges and universities, a Native American tribal
agency, and state and federal governmental entities, notably a
number of police and sheriff’s offices.5
In March 2013, a social experiment proved anecdotally
revealing on what the public then thought (and perhaps still
thinks) about UAS.6 The designer labeled the exercise “Let’s Check
the Google Autofill.”7 She typed “drones are” in the Google search
engine and then screen captured the results.8 Google displayed the
most common searches that began with “Drones are.”9 The results
in order of the frequency of the search term, were that drones are:
“good,” “bad,” “illegal,” “effective,” “the future,” “coming,”
“unethical,” “inaccurate,” and finally, “scary.”10
Those results convey mixed, but tending towards negative,
views of UAS. And presumably for some, possibly many, the term
is inextricably linked to the military UAS operating from the
United States and firing missiles in other countries against
suspected terrorists.11 This varied and situational attitude towards
(explaining the different types of regulations passed by states with regards to
UAS).
4. See 2011–2012 FAA List of Drone License Applicants, ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/document/2012-faa-list-drone-applicants
(last visited June 1, 2015) (collecting the entities that had applied for drone
license applications) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
5. See id. (listing Cornell University, Barona Band of Mission Indians Risk
Management Office, the U.S. Department of State, and more than a dozen local
law enforcement agencies among the drone license applicants).
6. See Caitlin Fitz Gerald, Drones Two Ways, DRAWNWARD.COM (Mar. 22,
2013), http://drawnward.com/2013/03/22/drones-two-ways/ (last visited June 6,
2015) (describing the investigation into the results of Google searches concerning
drones) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. See Karen DeYoung, Debate is Renewed on Control of Lethal Drone
Operations, WASH. POST (May 5, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.comworld/
national-security/debate-is-renewed-on-control-of-lethal-drone-operations
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UAS was also reflected in a March 2013 Gallup poll in which 65%
of the respondents thought the U.S. government should utilize
armed UAS against a suspected terrorist in another country, but
only 25% approved of that same use when the same suspected
terrorist was in the United States.12
Yet it is abundantly clear that UAS are coming to the United
States, though they likely will not be armed, at least with the
ability to deliver lethal force.13 Frankly, they are not only already
herethey have been here. Between 2007 and early 2013, the FAA
issued over 1,400 permits to domestic UAS operators.14 By 2018,
/2015/05/05/f096629c-f28c-11e4-bcc4-e8141e5eb0c9_story.html (last visited
June 2, 2015) (relating the recent history of military drone use, and reporting that
the United States has carried out an estimated 415 drone strikes in Yemen and
Pakistan resulting in 962 deaths) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
12. See Alyssa Brown & Frank Newport, In U.S., 65% Support Drone Attacks
on Terrorists Abroad, GALLUP (Mar. 25, 2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll/
161474/support-drone-attacks-terrorists-abroad.aspx (last visited June 2, 2015)
(explaining the survey’s methodology and reporting its results) (on file with the
Washington and Lee law Review).
13. Technically, it is not certain whether armed drones will be coming to the
United States. However, unarmed police helicopters have been used for decades
despite the technical capability for them to be armed. See EUROCOPTER, THE
“FORCE MULTIPLIER” IN LAW ENFORCEMENT 22–23 (2013) (advertising the features
of the latest model police helicopters). This precedent should mitigate concerns
over any sudden change in policies concerning the arming of police aviation. But
see North Dakota, supra note 2 (detailing that in North Dakota law enforcement
may permissibly use UAS equipped with less than lethal weapons). North
Dakota’s legislative process is an interesting reflection of the varied concerns
about law enforcement UAS as well as how the media characterizes such
legislation. The initial sponsor of the legislation sought a prohibition against UAS
being weaponized in any way. But when during the legislative process the
possibility arose that North Dakota police might be allowed to use UAS able to
deliver lethal force, the sponsor settled for systems able to deliver less than lethal
force. Id. The legislation contains a prohibition against UAS equipped with lethal
weapons. Thus, UAS equipped with less than lethal weapons would not violate
the law. And while North Dakota law enforcement have indicated there are no
plans to so equip UAS, media stories “allude to a dark, dismal world of legallysanctioned robot assault . . . .” See Kelsey D. Atherton, No, North Dakota Isn’t
Outfitting Police Drones with Tasers, POPULAR MECHANICS (Aug. 27, 2015),
http://www.popsci.com/no-north-dakota-isnt-putting-tasers-drones (last visited
Aug. 30, 2015) (explaining that “it certainly doesn’t seem like North Dakota is
about to start outfitting their quadcopters with tasers any time soon”) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
14. See Brian Bennett & Joel Rubin, Drones Are Taking to the Skies in the
U.S., L.A. TIMES (Feb. 15, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/feb/15/nation/lana-domestic-drones-20130216 (last visited June 8, 2015) (describing the growing
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the FAA estimates that as many as 7,500 commercial UAS will be
operating within the United States.15
The FAA has proposed a framework of regulations to achieve
the “safe integration of public, commercial and civil UAS” in
domestic air space.16 While you will not see delivery services like
Amazon’s Prime Air17 or the TacoCopter18—not yet, at least—the
FAA has already approved commercial UAS use “cover[ing] a wide
range of operations including motion picture, flare stack
inspection, crop survey and construction use.”19
The outgrowth of domestic UAS use is by no means limited to
commercial activities. Law enforcement entities around the
multitude of domestic uses for UAS in the United States) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
15. Busting Myths About the FAA and Unmanned Aircraft, FED. AVIATION
ADMIN. (Mar. 7, 2014, 4:44 PM), http://www.faa.gov/news/updates/?newsId
=76240 (last visited Aug. 7, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
16. See FED. AVIATION ADMIN., OVERVIEW OF SMALL UAS NOTICE OF PROPOSED
RULEMAKING (2015) (summarizing proposed regulations that include a 100 mph
speed limit and 500 foot altitude limit on UAS weighing less than fifty-five
pounds, a daylight-only use requirement, and the requirement that the device
remain within the unaided vision of the operator).
17. See Amazon Unveils Futuristic Plan: Delivery by Drone, 60 MINUTES (Dec.
1, 2013), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/amazon-unveils-futuristic-plan-deliveryby-drone/ (last visited June 8, 2015) (reporting on Amazon’s plan to implement a
service that uses UAS to deliver packages) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review). Because the current FAA rules require line of sight control over
UAS, Amazon is testing its autonomous aerial delivery system in Canada. See
Emily Chung, Amazon Tests Delivery Drones at a Secret Site in Canada—Here’s
Why, CBC NEWS (Mar. 30, 2015), http://www.cbc.ca/news/technology/amazontests-delivery-drones-at-a-secret-site-in-canada-here-s-why-1.3015425
(last
visited June 8, 2015) (describing Amazon’s UAS development program in Canada)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
18. See Flying Robots Deliver Tacos to Your Location, TACOCOPTER,
http://tacocopter.com/ (last visited June 8, 2015) (announcing a service that allows
users to order tacos on their smart phone and have them delivered via UAS) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). There were also short-lived
attempts at UAS delivery of beer to ice fisherman in Minnesota. See Liz Fields,
FAA Slaps Down Drone Beer Delivery to Ice Fishermen, ABC NEWS (Jan. 31, 2014)
http://abcnews.go.com/US/faa-slaps-drone-beer-delivery-service-icefishermen/story?id=22314625 (last visited June 8, 2015) (describing how the
“ingenious” service “had its wings clipped by the feds”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review). Both of these efforts, like Amazon’s UAS
delivery service, violate current FAA rules.
19. FED. AVIATION ADMIN., AEROSPACE FORECAST: FISCAL YEARS 2015–2035,
69 (2015).
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country are also acquiring unarmed UAS.20 Currently, a limited
number of police forces in the U.S. already employ UAS to assist
bomb squads,21 photograph accident scenes,22 and, in at least in
one instance, to assist in an arrest.23
Americans’ attitudes towards police UAS are mixed, to put it
mildly.24 Moreover, different attitudes can and certainly do exist
within the same community at the same time, perhaps best
illustrated in three states: Illinois, Virginia, and Washington.
Illinois enacted “The Freedom from Drone Surveillance Act” in
2013.25 One might think this legislation protects the citizens of
Illinois from such surveillance; however, the Act’s exceptions allow
law enforcement to use drones in several circumstances, including
surveillance of suspects.26
20. See Kaveh Waddel, Few Privacy Limitations Exist on How Police Use
Drones, NAT’L J. (Feb. 5, 2015), http://www.nationaljournal.com/tech/2015/02/05
/few-privacy-limitations-exist-on-how-police-use-drones (last visited June 8,
2015) (detailing representative examples of the motivations for law enforcement
agencies to acquire UAS and the steps they must take to do so) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
21. See Cyrus Farivar, Rare Cop-Owned Drone in California Could Fly Over
Bay
Area
Soon,
ARSTECHNICA,
(July
31,
2014,
10:15
AM),
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/07/rare-cop-owned-drone-in-californiacould-fly-over-bay-area-soon/ (last visited June 8, 2015) (documenting the
acquisition of a UAS by the San Jose Police Department for use by its bomb squad)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
22. See Noelle Steel, Greenfield Police to Use Drone for Accident Probes,
INDYSTAR (Aug. 17, 2014), http://www.indystar.com/story/news/2013/08/23/
greenfield-police-to-use-drone-for-accident-probes/2692295 (last visited June 8,
2015) (reporting on the acquisition of a $1,000 “drone quadcopter” by a local police
force in Indiana) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
23. See Michael Peck, Predator Drone Sends North Dakota Man to Jail,
FORBES (Jan. 27, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelpeck/2014/01/27/
predator-drone-sends-north-dakota-man-to-jail (last visited June 8, 2015)
(documenting the use of a Customs and Border Patrol drone to effectuate the
arrest of a man in North Dakota) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review); see also Scott Bomboy, A Legal Victory for Drones Warrants a Fourth
Amendment Discussion, CONST. DAILY (Feb. 7, 2014), http://blog.constitution
center.org/2014/02/a-court-victory-for-drones-warrants-a-fourth-amendment-dis
cussion (last visited June 8, 2015) (discussing the legal issues and implications
raised by the use of a Customs and Border Patrol drone in North Dakota) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
24. See Brown & Newport, supra note 12 (detailing the mixed opinions of
Americans regarding the use of drones).
25. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 167 (2013).
26. See id. at 167/15 (authorizing up to 45 days of such surveillance with the
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In 2013, the Virginia General Assembly passed a bill that
instituted a two-year moratorium on law enforcement UAS use.27
One day earlier, Charlottesville, Virginia became the first city in
the U.S. to ban their use.28 At the same time, Virginia Polytechnic
Institute and State University competed for, and was selected by
the FAA, as a UAS research and test site.29
In Washington, having successfully applied for a federal grant,
the Seattle Police Department purchased two UAS in 2010,
“envisioning uses during hostage situations and search-and-rescue
operations after disaster operations.”30 However, facing public
prior issuance of a warrant by a magistrate). Florida, by contrast, styled its
legislation the “Freedom from Unwanted Surveillance Act.” FLA. STAT. § 934.50
(2013). This designation raises the question as to what constitutes “wanted”
surveillance and who gets to make the distinction.
27. See 2013 Va. Acts 755 (imposing a moratorium except during exigent
circumstances such as an “Amber Alert,” or a natural disaster); see also Jason
Koebler, Virginia Becomes First State to Pass Drone Regulations, US NEWS (Feb.
5, 2013), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/02/05/virginia-becomesfirst-state-to-pass-drone-regulations- (last visited June 9, 2015) (reporting on the
reactions to the approval of the temporary ban) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review). But see Virginia, supra note 2 (detailing the end of the
moratorium and Virginia legislation regulating law enforcement UAS use taking
effect).
28. See Gloria Goodale, States Consider Drone Bans: Overreaction or Crucial
for
Privacy
Rights?
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR
(Feb.
6,
2013),
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/2013/0206/States-consider-drone-bansOverreaction-or-crucial-for-privacy-rights-video (last visited June 9, 2015)
(noting that UAS can “be extraordinarily useful, from crop monitoring to water
management and a whole host of emergency and life-saving functions” and
contending that this type of ban will disappear once the efficacy of such functions
are recognized) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
29. Press Release, Fed. Aviation Admin., FAA Announces Virginia Tech UAS
Test Site Now Operational (Aug. 13, 2014), https://www.faa.gov/
news/press_releases/news_story.cfm?newsId=16875>
(on
file
with
the
Washington and Lee Law Review). Virginia is not alone in being conflicted in its
attitudes towards UAS. Groups in thirty-seven states, some with restrictive UAS
laws, applied to serve as FAA test sites. See Richard Simon, States in a Race to
Secure Drone Testing, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 8, 2013), http://articles.latimes.
com/2013/apr/08/nation/la-na-drone-race-20130408 (last visited June 16, 2015)
(reporting on the efforts within states to secure test sites and quoting an advocate
for a New York-Massachusetts site as stating: “Clearly, we wouldn’t be interested
unless we thought there was money”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
30. Christine Clarridge, Seattle Grounds Police Drone Program, SEATTLE
TIMES (Feb. 7, 2013, 9:33 AM), http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/seattlegrounds-police-drone-program (last visited June 16, 2015) (detailing the
development of the short-lived UAS program) (on file with the Washington and
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outcry, the Mayor of Seattle ordered an end to the city’s police UAS
program before it ever started.31 Eventually, the city transferred
the UAS in 2012 to the Los Angeles Police Department, which
proudly announced their acquisition.32
These experimenting states could have used UAS legislation
to try to regulate surveillance in a broad or narrow fashion. Thus
far, their efforts have avoided the former and have largely failed
when addressing the latter.
Under the broad approach, states could have enacted
technology-neutral legislation that addressed government
surveillance regardless of the modality. This would cover
government surveillance in the variety of forms it can and will
take, including fixed cameras,33 enhanced capabilities in piloted

Lee Law Review).
31. See id. (reporting that the Mayor and Chief of Police decided that the
department would focus instead on “community building”).
32. See Shawn Musgrave, A ‘Gift’ for the LAPD: Two Surveillance Drones
Kicked Out of Seattle, MOTHERBOARD (June 4, 2014), http://motherboard.
vice.com/read/lapd-seattle-surveillance-drones (last visited June 16, 2015)
(detailing the lead-up to the transaction including the conservations between the
various agencies involved) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
Other police forces have faced similar challenges to Seattle’s. See Ashley
Balcerzak & Taylor Hiegel, Police Forces Struggle to Incorporate Drones, THE
DRONE PROJECT (Mar. 18, 2013), http://droneproject.nationalsecurityzone.org/
headline-police-forces-struggle-to-incorporate-drones-ashley-balcerzak-and-taylorhiegel/ (last visited June 16, 2015) (describing the technical, legal, and public
relations issues that often occur when local police forces attempt to incorporate
drones in their arsenal) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
33. See Terry Atlas & Greg Stohr, Surveillance Cameras Sought by Cities
After Boston Bombs, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Apr. 29, 2013), http://www.
bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-04-29/surveillance-cameras-sought-by-citiesafter-boston-bombs (last visited June 16, 2015) (explaining that Boston’s
Financial District employs over 200 private and public cameras, that Chicago
police “have access to about 10,000” cameras, and that New York is developing a
“Domain Awareness System” in addition to the approximately 3,000 cameras
already in place in lower and midtown Manhattan) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).

STATE LABS OF FEDERALISM AND LAW

1397

aerial surveillance,34 radars that “see” behind walls,35 as well as
UAS.
Alternatively, under the narrow approach, if unmanned
technology is deemed unique and prevalent enough, states could
make it the specific and sole subject of legislation. The current
efforts to do so are, on the whole, an ineffective and incomplete way
of achieving that result. They are myopically focused not just on
one surveillance technology—unmanned—but on only one form of
that technology: aerial.
Current societal anxiety towards UAS may well be rooted in
emotion, misconceptions, and biases about their use. Attempting
to assuage such concerns with legislation is unlikely to be
successful or effective, almost regardless of how one defines those
terms or from what perspective they are considered.
This Article assumes that UAS will become prevalent and, in
the process, will have fewer stigmas attached. As societal views
change, so too will state legislation. Accordingly, the current state
legislation regulating law enforcement UAS use is but the first
round of experiments. But it is important to take stock of what
state legislation would currently allow law enforcement to do with
UAS. This Article examines these state labs of federalism to
identify at what point, and which state UAS experiments, the
Supreme Court may rule constitute a search in violation of the
Fourth Amendment.36

34. See Craig Timberg, New Surveillance Technology Can Track Everyone in
an Area for Several Hours at a Time, WASH. POST (Feb. 5, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/new-surveillance-tech
nology-can-track-everyone-in-an-area-for-several-hours-at-a-time/2014/02/05
/82f1556e-876f-11e3-a5bd-844629433ba3_story.html (last visited June 16, 2015)
(describing an aerial surveillance system used in a piloted aircraft which “can
track every vehicle and person across an area the size of a small city”) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
35. See Debra Cassens Weiss, Feds Use Radar That Can Detect Movement in
Homes; Appeals Court Raises Privacy Concerns, A.B.A. J. (Jan. 21, 2015),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/feds_use_radar_that_can_detect_move
ment_in_homes_appeals_court_raises_priva (last visited June 16, 2015) (quoting
the Tenth Circuit as stating that hand-held radar devices “pos[e] grave Fourth
Amendment questions”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
36. The Article does not consider UAS use as part of border searches or the
special needs doctrine, though one can certainly envision those arguments for
UAS use.
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Part II clarifies what UAS are and details their technical
capabilities.37 Part III explains why the use of the term “drones” is,
or shortly will be, problematic as UAS become increasingly more
autonomous.38 Part IV provides a short review of basic Fourth
Amendment principles that apply when a court is faced with a
challenge to a government search.39 Part V explores the application
of the Fourth Amendment to past forms of aerial surveillance.40
Part VI explores its application to technological advances more
broadly.41 Part V first reviews the Supreme Court’s aerial
surveillance trilogy of cases and then reconsiders them in the
context of UAS. Part VI conducts a similar inquiry focusing on two
Supreme Court cases that deal with surveillance using senseenhancing technology. In Part VII, the Article shifts to state efforts
to regulate law enforcement UAS activities, assessing the
challenges implicit in many states’ efforts while drawing attention
to one proposal that provides a much needed mark on the wall in
terms of societal expectation for UAS surveillance.42
Ultimately, this Article concludes that the state approaches on
the whole have been little more than reactionary pandering to the
electorate.43 But more significantly, the state approaches, with one
potential exception, duck the key questions and issues surrounding
societal expectations and understandings of privacy that serve as
a check on governmental intrusion into our lives.
It is eminently reasonable to have concerns over how UAS
technology expands law enforcement surveillance capabilities to
37. See infra Part II (discussing the wide range of technical capabilities of
various UAS).
38. See infra Part III (advocating for the use of the term “UAS,” as opposed
to the potentially confusing “drone”).
39. See infra Part IV (discussing the baseline determinations that a court
must make in determining if a search occurred and whether that search was
reasonable).
40. See infra Part V (examining the Court’s aerial surveillance trilogy which
examined various forms of manned aerial surveillance under the Fourth
Amendment).
41. See infra Part VI (detailing the Court’s treatment of the use of advanced
sensory technologies under the Fourth Amendment).
42. See infra Part VII (explaining how state legislative efforts have thus far
failed to effectively regulate UAS use by law enforcement).
43. See infra Part VII (discussing ways in which state legislative efforts have
had a much lower impact than their proponents may have advertised).
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an extent that was previously unrealistic due to resource
constraints or technological feasibility. But there is another largely
unaddressed aspect to the debate. We should be able to separate
out police activities that have little if anything to do with a
“surveillance state.” Police photograph crime scenes, search for
missing people, chase down fugitives, and conduct permissible
warrantless searches in open fields. We need to discuss what our
societal expectations of privacy mean. In the process, we need to
resolve why it is that we would not want law enforcement to
conduct regular and routine actions more efficiently, more
effectively, more safely—and yes—more economically.44
II. Unmanned Aerial Systems
The FAA has defined an unmanned aircraft as “a device that
is used or intended to be used for flight in the air that has no
onboard pilot. This includes all classes of airplanes, helicopters,
airships and translational lift aircraft that have no onboard
pilot.”45 The FAA has also designated that UAS are aircraft as
defined by the Code of Federal Regulations.46
44. One commentator (currently the chief technology officer at Federal Trade
Commission) would use cost efficiencies as a measure of when privacy
expectations have been violated. Under this approach, “if the cost of the
surveillance using the new technique is an order of magnitude (ten times) less
than the cost of the surveillance without using the new technique, then the new
technique violates a reasonable expectation of privacy.” Askhan Soltani, The Cost
of Surveillance, ASHKAN SOLTANI (Jan. 9 2014), http://ashkansoltani.
org/2014/01/09/the-cost-of-surveillance (last visited June 22, 2015) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review). This approach would seem to both
discourage law enforcement innovation and effectiveness while providing an
incentive for artificially inflated UAS pricing.
45. AVIATION SAFETY UNMANNED AIRCRAFT PROGRAM OFFICE, FED. AVIATION
ADMIN., INTERIM OPERATIONAL APPROVAL GUIDANCE 8-01: UNMANNED AIRCRAFT
SYSTEMS OPERATIONS IN THE U.S. NATIONAL AIRSPACE SYSTEM (2008).
46. See 14 C.F.R. § 1.1 (2012) (defining “aircraft” as “a device that is used or
intended to be used for flight in the air”). That UAS are aircraft may seem selfevident, but in early 2014 a National Transportation Safety Board Administrative
Law Judge ruled that a flyable device used by an individual to film the University
of Virginia was a model aircraft and thus not subject to FAA rules. See Jack Nicas,
NTSB Rules Drones Are Aircraft, Subject to FAA Rules, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 18,
2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/ntsb-rules-drones-are-aircraft-and-subject-tofaa-rules-1416326767 (last visited June 10, 2015) (reporting on the initial ALJ
ruling and the eventual revision of the policy) (on file with the Washington and
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The term UAS should be thought of as very broad and
encompassing a vast range of devices, ranging from the size of
insects or birds,47 to small systems which are carried in a backpack
and employed by the operator tossing them in the air,48 all the way
to systems with a 130 foot wingspan.49 The capabilities of UAS are
correspondingly diverse; there are systems which can only fly for
minutes at low altitude,50 those which can fly for a day at a time
and higher than commercial air traffic,51 and everything in
between.52 Some UAS are battery powered, others use liquid fuel.53
Lee Law Review). In November, 2014 the NTSB overturned that ruling, noting
that “[t]he plain language of the statutory and regulatory definitions is clear: an
‘aircraft’ is any device used for flight in the air.” Huerta v. Pirker, NTSB Order
No. EA-5730 at 3 (2014). The NTSB did concede that “the definitions are as broad
as they are clear, but they are clear nonetheless.” Id. at 2.
47. See Adam Pior, Rise of the Insect Drone, POPULAR SCI. (Jan. 29, 2014),
http://www.popsci.com/article/technology/rise-insect-drones (last visited June 18,
2015) (reporting that “[e]ngineers have developed the first insect-inspired
vehicles, opening the door to an entirely new class of machine: the microdrone”)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
48. See UAS RQ-11B Raven, AEROVIRONMENT, INC. (2015), http://www.
avinc.com/uas/small_uas/raven/ (last visited June 17, 2015) (advertising the
privately developed RQ-11B Raven a hand-launched UAS “designed for rapid
deployment and high mobility for military applications requiring low-altitude
surveillance and reconnaissance intelligence”) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
49. See Global Hawk, NORTHROP GRUMMAN, (2015), http://www.north
ropgrumman.com/capabilities/globalhawk/Pages/default.aspx (last visited June
15, 2015) [hereinafter Global Hawk] (detailing the Global Hawk reconnaissance
UAS which has been used extensively by the U.S. military and has a 130 foot
wingspan and can stay airborne for over thirty hours) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
50. See Parrot Bebop Drone, PARROT, http://www.parrot.com/usa/products/
bebop-drone/ (last visited June 20, 2015) (advertising the “lightweight and safe”
Bebop drone which can be controlled using an iPhone and has a lithium battery
that allows for twenty-two minutes of flight) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
51. See Global Hawk, supra note 49 (describing a massive and
correspondingly expensive UAS designed for military and intelligence use).
52. See Jeremy Bender, A Complete Guide to Drones, in One Picture, SLATE
(Feb. 2, 2014), http://www.slate.com/blogs/business_insider/2014/02/02/diagram_
different_types_of_drones.html (last visited June 21, 2015) (providing an
illustrated guide to various types of drones used by nations around the world) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
53. See David Hambling, Longer-Lasting Drones Powered by Fuel Cells,
POPULAR MECHANICS. (May 3, 2013), http://www.popularmechanics.com/military/
a8956/longer-lasting-drones-powered-by-fuel-cells-15425554/ (last visited June
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Regardless of power source, efforts are underway to allow mid-air
recharging54 or refueling,55 such that a UAS might never need to
land.56 Virtually all UAS have some form of optics, cameras and
other sensors by which the UAS captures images, which can be
either recorded or transmitted to the operator.57 The UAS optics
generally include magnification and, on more advanced systems,
infrared or thermal imaging which detect and distinguishes heat
sources.58 While this Article focuses on the aerial unmanned
system, there are numerous ground59 and aquatic60 variants of
unmanned systems. Often capable of capturing both images and

20, 2015) (recapping some of the recent developments and improvements in the
technology used to power UAS) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
54. See Richard White, How it Works: Laser Beaming Recharges UAV in
Flight,
POPULAR MECHANICS,
(July
28,
2012),
http://www.popular
mechanics.com/flight/drones/a7966/how-it-works-laser-beaming-recharges-uavin-flight-11091133/ (last visited June 19, 2015) (explaining new technological
advancements which use lasers to recharge a UAS’s battery and allow it to remain
airborne for forty-eight hours) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
55. See Brian Anderson, Oh, Great: Now Drones Can Refuel in Midair,
MOTHERBOARD (Oct. 8, 2012), http://motherboard.vice.com/blog/oh-great-nowdrones-can-refuel-in-midair (last visited June 20, 2015) (reporting on a successful
trial of techniques and technology that allow for one UAS to refuel another
midair) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
56. See id. (“It’s harbinger of a coming age of near endless flight and, by
extension, near endless surveillance.”).
57. See, e.g., Global Hawk Integrated Sensor Suite, RAYTHEON,
http://www.raytheon.com/capabilities/products/globalhawk_iss/ (last visited June
20, 2015) (describing that the Global Hawk’s optical capabilities “combin[e] a
cloud-penetrating synthetic aperture radar (SAR) antenna with a ground moving
target indicator (GMTI), a high resolution electro-optical (EO) digital camera and
an infrared (IR) sensor”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
58. Id.
59. See Technology, TRANSCEND ROBOTICS, http://www.transcendrobotics.
com/ (last visited June 20, 2015) (depicting advances of ground-based unmanned
systems capable of climbing stairs and assisting in construction, HAZMAT
scenarios, filming, and search and rescue) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
60. Ben Coxworth, Ziphius Takes Drone Tech to the Waves, GIZMAG (June 28,
2013), http://www.gizmag.com/ziphius-aquatic-drone/28097 (last visited June 20,
2015) (describing unmanned aquatic system which transmits high definition
video to its operator in real time) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
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audio, these systems fall outside the current state legislation,
which only regulates police use of unmanned aerial systems.61
III. Why UAS Are Not “Drones”
The term “drone” is commonly used in place of the wordy
“unmanned aerial systems.”62 While understandable, the term
drone risks confusion; if not now, then in the future.63 The current
conversation, and this Article, involves remotely piloted systems,
meaning that a human being controls the system remotely from
the ground.64 The actions of the UAS are determined by its human
operator; the UAS turns right or climbs because its operator
directed those actions.65
The next generation of UAS, though, will not be piloted; they
will be increasingly autonomous.66 Humans will not fly or pilot
these systems remotely; rather, we will direct them to fly a certain
61. See infra Part VII (discussing state legislation that has been passed in
recent years).
62. See Ben Zimmer, The Flight of ‘Drone’ From Bees to Planes, WALL ST. J.
(July 26, 2013), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014241278873241104045
78625803736954968 (last visited June 20, 2015) (tracing the ascension of the term
into common parlance) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
63. See Nidhi Subbaraman, Don’t Call ‘em Drones: The Wide World of
Unmanned
Flying
Machines,
NBC
NEWS
(Mar.
15,
2013),
http://www.nbcnews.com/technology/technolog/dont-call-em-drones-wide-worldunmanned-flying-machines-1C8857699
(last
visited
June
20,
2015)
(acknowledging the disparate group of technologies that get swept under the term
“drone” and reporting criticism of the use from various corners) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
64. Cf. Corey Mead, A Rare Look Inside the Air Force’s Drone Training
Classroom, THE ATLANTIC (June 4, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/
technology/archive/2014/06/a-rare-look-inside-the-air-forces-drone-training-class
room/372094/ (last visited June 20, 2015) (reporting on the training program the
United States Air Force puts its UAS operators through) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
65. See id. (describing some of the skills that must be mastered by drone
operators before controlling during live missions).
66. See Brian Fung, Get Ready: The Autonomous Drones Are Coming, THE
ATLANTIC (Jan. 16, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/
01/get-ready-the-autonomous-drones-are-coming/267246/ (last visited June 13,
2015) (addressing the technological advances and the policy issues that will be
faced the technology comes into wide use) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
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route.67 Depending on the level of autonomy, the system would
even take off, and, having the capability to detect other objects on
the ground and in the air, fly to “point A” without human
intervention or direction.68 To this author’s thinking, we should
reserve the term drone for autonomous systems. While that
linguistic argument is likely lost, society will probably want to
distinguish between devices flying in the air at the direction of a
human operator and increasingly autonomous systems which
perform navigation and other functions which a human operator
currently performs or directs.
For the remainder of the Article, it is useful to consider if and
how the answer to a Fourth Amendment question involving UAS
may or may not change, depending on the type of UAS and its
capabilities. For example, a UAS with no magnification may be
seen differently than surveillance using binoculars or thermal
imaging that can “see” through walls or roofs. Similarly, consider
how a court might distinguish between small, mobile UAS with
relatively short flight time, large semi-autonomous systems that
operate for several hours, and systems which can refuel or
recharge mid-air and are capable of continuous surveillance of an
individual for an entire month.
IV. The Fourth Amendment
Before discussing first the Supreme Court’s aerial surveillance
trilogy and then selected technology-based cases, it is useful to
review what is at issue in Fourth Amendment cases. A court must
initially determine if government efforts constitute a search or
seizure of a person, their house, their papers, or their effects.69
67. See Mike Murphy, Truly Autonomous Drones are Coming, and They May
Soon Deliver Packages to Your Door, QUARTZ (May 15, 2015),
http://qz.com/405263/truly-autonomous-drones-are-coming-and-they-may-soonde liver-packages-to-your-door/ (last visited June 21, 2015) (describing the
current level of technological advancement in the field and addressing the ways
designers are pushing the limit of what these UAS can do) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
68. See id. (focusing on the issues related to autonomous navigation that are
being work on by designers and engineers).
69. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated . . . .”) (emphasis added).
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Then the court must determine if that search or seizure was
unreasonable.70 These determinations turn on the application of
Katz v. United States,71 a 1967 Supreme Court case which clarified
that the Fourth Amendment “protects people, not places.”72 In
Katz, the Court instructed that the “Fourth Amendment cannot be
translated into a general constitutional ‘right to privacy.’”73
Through Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion, Katz is the source of
a two-part test to determine whether a reasonable expectation of
privacy exists such that government intrusion would constitute a
search.74 The court must determine “whether the individual has
exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy” and
“whether society is prepared to recognize that expectation as
reasonable.”75
V. Manned Aircraft Surveillance
The Supreme Court’s treatment of law enforcement use of
manned aerial surveillance provides a useful starting point for
predicting how UAS will fare under the Fourth Amendment. Three
cases, California v. Ciraolo,76 Florida v. Riley,77 and Dow Chemical
Co. v. United States,78 comprise what one commentator referred to

70. See id. (guaranteeing protection against “unreasonable searches and
seizures”) (emphasis added).
71. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
72. Id. at 351.
73. Id. at 350.
74. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J.
concurring) (“My understanding of the rule that has emerged from prior decisions
is that there is a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that
society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”).
75. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) (accepting Harlan’s
formulation as the proper test to determine reasonable expectations of privacy).
76. 476 U.S. 207 (1986). See generally Laura L. Krakovec, Fourth
Amendment—Constitutionality of Warrantless Aerial Surveillance: California v.
Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. 1809 (1986), 77 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 602 (1986)
(providing an in-depth analysis of the case, the Court’s decision, and its possible
impact).
77. 488 U.S. 445 (1989).
78. 476 U.S. 227 (1986).

STATE LABS OF FEDERALISM AND LAW

1405

as the “aerial surveillance trilogy.”79 This trilogy provides the base
of the analytical framework upon which two significant technology
based cases will later be added.80
A. California v. Ciraolo
In 1982, Santa Clara, California police received an anonymous
tip that Dante Ciraolo was growing marijuana in his backyard.81
The contents of Ciraolo’s backyard were not visible from the street
due to a six foot outer fence and a ten foot inner fence.82 As a result,
two Santa Clara police officers used a private plane to fly over
Ciraolo’s house “at an altitude of 1000 feet, within navigable
airspace.”83 The officers, who had been trained in marijuana
detection, observed marijuana plants growing in the yard and
“photographed the area with a standard 35mm camera.”84
Based on the anonymous tip and their fly-over observations
and photographs, the police obtained a search warrant and seized
seventy-three marijuana plants from Ciraolo’s backyard.85 The
trial court denied Ciraolo’s motion to suppress, which the
California Court of Appeals reversed on the grounds that that the
aerial observation constituted a warrantless search in violation of
the Fourth Amendment.86
The Supreme Court reversed the California Court of Appeals
and determined that Ciraolo’s “expectation that his garden was
protected from [aerial observation] is unreasonable, and is not an
79. See Joseph J. Vacek, Big Brother Will Soon Be Watching—Or Will He?
Constitutional, Regulatory, and Operational Issues Surrounding the Use of
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in Law Enforcement, 85 N.D. L. REV. 673, 681 (2009)
(“The Court’s holdings form an ‘aerial surveillance trilogy’ and the basis for aerial
surveillance Fourth Amendment law.”).
80. See id. (contending that Ciraolo, Riley, and Dow are the starting point
for any future analysis of aerial law enforcement surveillance under the Fourth
Amendment).
81. See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 209 (1986) (recounting the facts
that lead to Ciraolo’s prosecution).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 209–10.
86. Id. at 210.
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expectation that society is prepared to honor.”87 The Court
reviewed and applied the two-part inquiry under Katz and its
progeny to determine whether Ciraolo had a constitutionally
protected reasonable expectation of privacy in his backyard
garden: “[F]irst, has the individual manifested a subjective
expectation of privacy in the object of the challenged search?
Second, is society willing to recognize that expectation as
reasonable?”88
In erecting two different fences, there was no question that
Ciraolo had taken precaution to maintain his privacy and in so
doing manifested his subjective expectation of privacy.89 But the
Court found his expectation societally unreasonable.90
There was no dispute that Ciraolo’s backyard was considered
in the curtilage of his home.91 The Court noted that “[a]t common
law, the curtilage is the area to which extends the intimate activity
associated with the sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of
life.”92 Moreover, the Court noted that “[t]he protection afforded
the curtilage is essentially a protection of families and personal
privacy in an area intimately linked to the home, both physically
and psychologically, where privacy expectations are most
heightened.”93
But the Court quickly added
[t]hat the area is within the curtilage does not itself bar all
police observations. The Fourth Amendment protection of the
home has never been extended to require law enforcement
officers to shield their eyes when passing by a home on public
thoroughfares. Nor does the mere fact that an individual has
taken measures to restrict some views of his activities preclude
an officer’s observations from a public vantage point where he

87. Id. at 214.
88. Id. at 211 (citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979)).
89. See id. (“Clearly—and understandably—respondent has met the test of
manifesting his own subjective intent and desire to maintain privacy as to his
unlawful agricultural pursuits.”).
90. See id. at 215 (rejecting Ciraolo’s expectation as one society is prepared
to recognize).
91. See id. at 213 (recounting the history and definition of curtilage and
accepting that Ciraolo’s marijuana plants were within that space).
92. Id. at 212 (internal quotations omitted).
93. Id. at 213.
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has a right to be and which renders the activities clearly
visible.94

The Court noted that “[a]ny member of the public flying in this
airspace who glanced down could have seen everything that these
officers observed.”95 Quoting Katz, the Court reiterated that
“[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own
home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.”96
The opinion’s penultimate sentence frames the ruling’s
qualifications: “[I]n an age where private and commercial flight in
the public airways is routine, it is unreasonable for [Ciraolo] to
expect that his marijuana plants were constitutional protected
from being observed with the naked eye from an altitude of 1,000
feet.” 97
The significance of the “naked eye” concept will be discussed
later in Part VI. The altitude in this case was important for two
reasons. First, at 1,000 feet, the police observed Ciraolo’s backyard
“in a physically nonintrusive manner.”98 Second, flying at 1,000
feet placed the police within public navigable airspace.99
The significance of the surveillance occurring within public
navigable airspace was tested three years later in Florida v.
Riley,100 where the Court had the opportunity to consider lower
altitude and a different aerial surveillance platform.
B. Florida v. Riley
The facts in Florida v. Riley are exceedingly similar to those
in Ciraolo. Following an anonymous tip that Riley was growing
marijuana in a greenhouse behind his residence and being unable
to observe the inside of the greenhouse, a Florida county Sherriff’s
office took to the skies.101 Instead of the fixed wing plane the police
in Ciraolo flew at an altitude of 1,000 feet, in Riley, the police were
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id.
Id. at 213–14.
Id. at 213.
Id. at 215.
Id. at 213.
Id. (citation omitted).
488 U.S. 445 (1989).
See id. at 448 (describing the facts of the case).
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in a helicopter and flew at 400 feet.102 As in Ciraolo, the airborne
law enforcement officer used his naked eye to observe someone’s
backyard.103 Through openings in the side and roof of the
greenhouse, police observed what appeared to be marijuana.
Officers obtained a warrant, and the resulting physical search of
the greenhouse revealed just that.104 A Florida trial court granted
Riley’s motion to suppress, the Florida Court of Appeals reversed
the trial court, and the Florida Supreme Court in turn quashed the
Court of Appeals’s decision and reinstated the trial court’s
suppression order.105 In a plurality opinion, the Supreme Court
largely repeated its Ciraolo analysis and found that the 400-foot
aerial surveillance of Riley’s greenhouse did not violate the Fourth
Amendment.106 While the FAA’s altitude for fixed wing aircraft is
500 feet, helicopters may permissibly operate at a lower altitude
so long as operation is “without hazard to persons or property on
the surface.”107 The Court noted that the surveillance at issue did
not cause undue noise, wind, dust, or otherwise interfere with
Riley’s normal use of the greenhouse.108 However, the Supreme
Court claimed that it “would have a different case if flying at [400
feet] had been contrary to law or regulation.”109
Returning to a Ciraolo type analysis, the Court claimed that
“[a]ny member of the public could legally have been flying over
Riley’s property in a helicopter at an altitude of 400 feet and could
have observed Riley’s greenhouse. The police officer did no
more.”110
The Court unsuccessfully tried to claim a boundary on such
searches, saying, “This is not to say that an inspection of the
curtilage of a house from an aircraft will always pass muster under
the Fourth Amendment simply because the plane is within
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 449.
105. See id. at 449 (relating the procedural history of the case).
106. See id. at 451–52 (announcing the Court’s holding).
107. See id. at 451 n.3 (describing and applying the rule set forth in 14 C.F.R.
§ 91.79).
108. See id. at 452 (noting that the record showed no physical interference
with Riley’s property rights).
109. Id. at 451.
110. Id.
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navigable airspace as defined by law.”111 Yet the Court held that
the fact the helicopter was within navigable airspace was “of
obvious importance” and claimed that “there is nothing in the
record or before us to suggest that helicopters flying at 400 feet are
sufficiently rare in this country to lend substance to [Riley’s] claim
he reasonably anticipated that his greenhouse would not be subject
to observation from that altitude.”112 While the Court made no
effort to quantify what number of flights below 400 feet had
occurred such that they were not “sufficiently rare,” in a footnote,
the Court instructed that “every State in the country uses
helicopters in police work. As of 1980, there were 1,500 such
aircraft used in police work. More than 10,000 helicopters, both
public and private are registered in the United States.”113
Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion raises questions about
the majority’s analysis in Riley and, when read in conjunction with
the technology cases discussed in Part VI, offers insight into how
police drone surveillance cases may be decided in the future.114
O’Connor argued that the “plurality’s approach rests the scope of
the Fourth Amendment too heavily on compliance with FAA
regulations whose purpose is to promote air safety, not to protect
“[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures.”115
Justice O’Connor further took issue with the plurality test of
whether the public could legally have been at the same altitude
and location as the police conducting aerial surveillance.116 She
contended that

111. Id.
112. Id. at 451–52.
113. Id. at 450 n.2 (internal citations omitted).
114. See J. Tyler Black, Note, Over Your Head, Under the Radar: An
Examination of Changing Legislation, Aging Case Law, and Possible Solutions to
the Domestic Drone Puzzle, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1829, 1830 (2013) (predicting
that “[t]he drone revolution promises to increase substantially the ability of law
enforcement to serve and protect their jurisdictions”).
115. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 452 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
116. See id. at 452 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“In my view, the
plurality’s approach rests the scope of the Fourth Amendment too heavily on
compliance with FAA regulations whose purpose is to promote air safety, not to
protect [Fourth Amendment rights].”).
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[i]f the public rarely, if ever, travels overhead at such altitudes,
the observation cannot be said to be from a vantage point
generally used by the public and Riley cannot be said to have
‘knowingly expose[d]’ his greenhouse to public view. However if
the public can generally be expected to travel over residential
backyards at an altitude of 400 feet, Riley cannot reasonably
expect his curtilage to be free from such aerial observation. 117

Having distinguished between fixed and rotary wing naked
eye surveillance at 1,000 and 400 feet respectively, the final case
in the trilogy presented two variants: commercial, not residential
property, and the use of enhanced aerial surveillance equipment.
C. Dow Chemical Co. v. United States
In the same year as Ciraolo, the Supreme Court also decided
Dow Chemical Co. v. United States.118 Dow operated a massive
2,000-acre chemical manufacturing facility in Michigan.119 After
Dow refused the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) request
to conduct a site inspection, the EPA took to the sky.120 Flying at
altitudes of 1,200, 3,000, and 12,000 feet, a commercial aerial
photographer employed by the EPA used a standard but precise
aerial mapping camera.121 Dow sought to enjoin the EPA from
future aerial surveillance and filed suit in United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Michigan.122 The District Court
held that the surveillance constituted a search and that it had
violated Dow’s reasonable expectation of privacy.123 The Sixth
Circuit reversed, finding that while Dow had a subjective
expectation of privacy from ground intrusion, it had manifested no
such expectation in terms of aerial surveillance.124 The Court of
117. Id. at 455.
118. 476 U.S. 227 (1986).
119. See id. at 229 (describing the facts of the case).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. See id. at 230 (describing the procedural posture of the case).
123. See id. (describing that the district court “found that Dow had manifested
an expectation of privacy in its exposed plant areas because it intentionally
surrounded them with buildings and other enclosures”).
124. See id. (explaining that the appeals court argued that taking such
precautions were feasible).
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Appeals distinguished between Dow’s lack of precautions against
aerial surveillance and its “elaborate ground-level precautions.”125
The Supreme Court first addressed how to consider a large
industrial complex under the Fourth Amendment.126 One option
was that the complex was an “open field,” meaning it was not
including under the Fourth Amendment’s protection of “persons,
houses, papers and effects.”127 Another option, advocated by Dow,
was that the plant was “industrial curtilage” and was thus covered
by the Fourth Amendment.128
The Court concluded that the facility “can perhaps best be
seen as seen as falling somewhere between ‘open fields’ and
curtilage, but lacking some of the critical characteristics of both.”129
In terms of the Constitutional protections afforded this
intermediate status, the Court acknowledged that “the
businessman, like the occupant of a residence, has a constitutional
right to go about his property free from unreasonable official
entries upon his private commercial property.”130 Yet here, the
concern is “aerial observation of a 2,000-acre outdoor
manufacturing facility without physical entry.”131 And the Court
recognized that “the government has ‘greater latitude to conduct
warrantless inspections of commercial property’ because ‘the
expectations of privacy that the owner of commercial property
enjoys in such property differs significantly from the sanctity
accorded an individual home.’”132 Similar to the analysis in Ciraolo
125. Id.
126. See id. at 235 (addressing the Fourth Amendment claims brought by Dow
Chemical Co.).
127. U.S. CONST. amend IV; see also Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 184
(1984) (reiterating that open fields do not fall within the specifically protected
categories of the Fourth Amendment and are thus government intrusion into
them is not unreasonable).
128. See Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 235 (1986) (relating
Dow’s argument that the aerial photography of the plant violated the company’s
reasonable expectation of privacy in that constitutionally protected space); see
also Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 311 (1978) (“The Warrant Clause of
the Fourth Amendment protects commercial buildings as well as private homes.”).
129. Id. at 236.
130. Dow, 476 U.S. at 237 (quoting See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 543
(1967)).
131. Id. (emphasis in original).
132. Id. at 237–38 (quoting Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 599 (1981)).
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and Riley, the Court stated that “what is observable by the public
is observable without a warrant, by the Government inspector as
well.”133
On the issue of the magnified nature of the surveillance, the
Court claimed that the “EPA was not employing some unique
sensory device that, for example, could penetrate the walls of
buildings and record conversations in Dow’s plants, offices or
laboratories, but rather a conventional, albeit precise, commercial
camera commonly used in mapmaking.”134 The District Court had
labeled the surveillance equipment “the finest precision aerial
camera available” and that it allowed the EPA to photograph “a
great deal more than the human eye could ever see.”135 However,
the Supreme Court qualified Dow’s contention that “simple
magnification permits identification of objects such as wires as
small as ½ inch in diameter.”136 The Court claimed that the wires,
power lines really,
are observable only because of their stark contrast with the
snow-white background. No objects as small as ½ inch in
diameter such as a class ring, for example, are recognizable, nor
are there any identifiable human faces or secret documents
captured in such a fashion as to implicate more serious privacy
concerns. Fourth Amendment cases must be decided on the
facts of each case, not by extravagant generalizations. 137

Finally, in a harbinger of things to come in the technology line
of cases, the Court focused on the surveillance equipment being
generally available to the public and the corresponding pictures
being
not so revealing of intimate details as to raise constitutional
concerns. Although [the images] undoubtedly give EPA more
detailed information than naked-eye views, they remain limited
to an outline of the facilities buildings and equipment. The mere
fact that human vision is enhanced somewhat, at least to the
degree here, does not give rise to constitutional problems. 138

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id. at 238 (quoting Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 315 (1978)).
Id.
Id. at 235.
Id. at 238.
Id. at 238 n.5.
Id. at 238.
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VI. Applying the Surveillance Trilogy to UAS
Looking only at the manned aerial surveillance cases, several
aspects stand out in identifying how the Court may rule when such
surveillance is unmanned. The first is Justice O’Connor’s point on
the problems linking constitutionality to FAA regulations.139
Under the FAA’s UAS rules, operating a UAS at less than 500 feet
and within the line of sight of the operator is permissible in the
same way that flying the helicopter at 400 feet in Riley or the plane
at 1,000 feet in Ciraolo was.140
The second point is how the Court formulated whether the
presence of manned aircraft was “sufficiently rare” to justify an
expectation that one’s property would not be under aerial
surveillance.141 Recall that the Court considered two factors:
1) that the public could have been in the same point in the public
airspace as was law enforcement; and 2) that some 1,500 police
helicopters operating in the U.S. meant their use was not rare.142
The UAS-using public will indeed be able to be at the same point
in the public airspace as the police, and there will be far more UAS
than helicopters. As previously referenced, by 2018 the FAA
estimates there will some 7,500 UAS in the UAS, four times the
number of helicopters the Supreme Court used to justify a finding
that aerial surveillance was not sufficiently rare.143
In terms of law enforcement’s ability to use UAS with
enhanced cameras or to loiter over one location for an extended
period of time, two subsequent technology-based surveillance
opinions from the Supreme Court build on the analytic framework.

139. See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 452 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring)
(“In my view, the plurality’s approach rests the scope of the Fourth Amendment
too heavily on compliance with FAA regulations whose purpose is to promote air
safety, not to protect [Fourth Amendment rights].”).
140. See id. at 451 n.3 (describing and applying the regulations set forth in 14
CFR § 91.79).
141. See id. at 451 (contending that there was no evidence that helicopters
“flying at 400 feet are sufficiently rare in this country to lend substance to
respondent's claim that he reasonably anticipated that his greenhouse would not
be subject to observation from that altitude”).
142. Id.
143. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (discussing predictions
regarding UAS use in the near future).
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A. Technology Cases
1. Kyllo v. United States

Fifteen years passed before the Supreme Court returned to the
unanswered question from Dow about the permissible level of
technological enhancement or advancement in government
surveillance of the home. In Kyllo v. United States,144 an agent with
the Department of Interior (DOI) suspected marijuana was being
grown in Danny Kyllo’s Oregon house, based on an informant’s
tip.145 While parked across the street, the agent used a handheld
thermal imager to detect the amount of infrared radiation, or heat,
emanating from Kyllo’s house.146 The garage emanated
significantly more heat than either the rest of his or neighbors’
homes.147 The abnormal heat levels were significant because
“indoor marijuana growth typically requires high-intensity
lamps.”148 The agent, relying on the thermal imaging results,
Kyllo’s utility bills, and the informant’s tip secured a warrant.149
In executing the warrant, agents found and seized “an indoor
growing operation involving more than 100 plants” from Kyllo’s
house.150 Kyllo unsuccessfully sought to suppress the evidence
seized from his house.151 While procedurally complicated,
ultimately both the trial court and the Ninth Circuit, applying
Ciraolo and Dow, upheld the validity of the warrant, which relied
upon the thermal imaging.152
Initially, the Court observed that the “right of a man to retreat
into his own home and there be free from unreasonable
governmental intrusion” is “at the very core of the Fourth
144. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
145. See id. at 29 (reciting the facts that led to Kyllo’s prosecution).
146. See id. (explaining that indoor marijuana growing operations often use
heat lamps which emit heat signatures that can be observed with a thermal
imager).
147. See id. at 30 (describing the information gained from the thermal scan).
148. Id. at 29.
149. See id. at 30 (describing the investigation that preceding the case).
150. Id.
151. See id. (noting the procedural history of the case).
152. See id. at 30–31 (describing the holdings and rationales adopted by the
lower courts).
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Amendment,” and that “[w]ith few exceptions the question
whether a warrantless search of a home is reasonable and hence
constitutional must be answered no.”153
But as the Supreme Court noted, presumably with some
chagrin, the inquiry in Kyllo involved “assessing when a search is
not a search . . . .”154 Quoting Ciraolo, the Kyllo Court reiterated
that “a Fourth Amendment search does occur—even when the
explicitly protected location of a house is concerned—unless ‘the
individual manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the
object of the challenged search,’” and “society [is] willing to
recognize that expectation as reasonable.’”155
While the DOI agent was on a public street when conducting
the surveillance, in using the thermal imager, he engaged in “more
than naked-eye surveillance of a home.”156 The Court distinguished
this surveillance from Dow’s based on the heightened privacy
expectations of an area adjacent to a home, like Kyllo’s garage,
compared to the industrial areas photographed in Dow.157
The Court acknowledged the lower court findings that the
thermal imager was a “non-intrusive device which emits no rays or
beams and shows a crude visual image of the heat being radiated
from the outside of the house,” that it “cannot penetrate walls or
windows to reveal conversations or human activities,” and that the
specific images collected “did not show any people or activity.”158
Yet, the Court rejected the government’s attempt to distinguish
the thermal imaging as “off the wall” not “through the wall
surveillance” as a mechanical interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment.159 To the majority, the end result of the government’s
approach would be to “leave the homeowner at the mercy of
advancing technology—including imaging technology that could
discern all human activity in the home.”160
153. Id. at 31 (internal quotation marks omitted).
154. Id. at 32.
155. Id. at 33 (quoting California v. Ciraolo 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986))
(emphasis in original).
156. Id.
157. See id. (noting that Dow explicitly found its industrial areas to have a
lower expectation of privacy than areas adjacent to a home).
158. Id. at 30.
159. Id. at 35.
160. Id.
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The government also argued that the thermal imaging was not
a search under Dow because it did not “detect private activities
occurring in private areas.”161 Here, the Court was unequivocal
that “[t]he Fourth Amendment’s protection of the home has never
been tied to measurement of the quality or quantity of information
obtained” and that “any physical invasion of the home ‘by even a
fraction of an inch’ was too much.”162
The government also attempted to leverage a section from the
Ciraolo opinion that aerial surveillance would become invasive if
“modern technology revealed those intimate associations, objects
or activities otherwise imperceptible to police or fellow citizens.”163
While the government was apparently focused on the argument
that the thermal imaging did not reveal intimate associations, the
Kyllo Court labeled the language from Ciraolo as “second-hand
dicta” whose focus was “not upon intimacy but upon otherwiseimperceptibility, which is precisely the principle we vindicate
today.”164 The majority was clear that “[i]n the home, our cases
show, all details are intimate details, because the entire area is
held safe from prying government eyes.”165
The Court’s holding in Kyllo was that “[o]btaining by senseenhancing technology any information regarding the interior of the
home that could not otherwise have been obtained without
‘physical intrusion into a constitutionally protected area’
constitutes a search—at least where, (as here) the technology in
question is not in general public use.”166 The majority recognized
that linking the constitutionality or lack thereof to whether
161. Id. at 37.
162. Id. (quoting Silverman v. United States, 364 U.S. 505, 512 (1961)).
163. Id. at 38 n.5.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 37. The majority went on to explain the impractical nature of a test
based on whether the information the government obtained through surveillance
of the home was of “intimate details.” Among other reasons such a test would be
unworkable (in addition to as the majority held “wrong in principle”), the
government would need to evaluate the collected information in advance,
something that could only be done after the surveillance was complete. See id. at
39 (“And even when (if ever) that jurisprudence were fully developed, no police
officer would be able to know in advance whether his through-the-wall
surveillance picks up “intimate” details—and thus would be unable to know in
advance whether it is constitutional.”).
166. Id. (internal citations omitted).
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technology was in general public use was, as the dissent argued,
“inject[ing] potential uncertainty into the Constitutional
analysis . . . .”167 But the majority claimed, “That quarrel, however,
is not with us but this Court’s precedent.”168 The majority then
ducked the issue(s) it both created and recognized with the
“general public use” predicate. The Court quoted Ciraolo and
added that “[g]iven that we can quite confidently say that thermal
imaging is not ‘routine’ we decline in this case to reexamine that
factor.”169
2. United States v. Jones
Over a decade passed before the Supreme Court dealt with
another technological advancement, continuous global positioning
system (GPS) surveillance, in United States v. Jones.170 Suspecting
Antoine Jones of narcotics trafficking, District of Columbia police
and the Federal Bureau of Investigation applied for and received a
warrant to install a GPS tracking device on Jones’ car.171
Specifically, the warrant authorized the installation of the device
within ten days and in the District of Columbia.172 Eleven days
after the warrant was issued, law enforcement agents attached the
device to Jones’ car while it was parked in a public parking lot in
Maryland, not D.C.173 For the next twenty-eight days, the
government tracked the vehicle’s movements. With the assistance
of multiple satellites, “the device established the vehicle’s location
with 50 to 100 feet, and communicated that location by cellular
phone to a government computer. It relayed more than 2,000 pages
of data over the 4-week period.”174
This data, along with other information, led authorities to
charge Jones and several others with many drug-related criminal

167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Id. at 39 n.6.
Id.
Id.
132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
See id. at 948 (reciting the facts of the case).
See id. (describing the warrant that was issued).
Id.
Id.
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violations.175 Jones sought to suppress the evidence obtained via
the GPS tracker.176 The District Court granted his motion in part,
suppressing the location data obtained while Jones’ car was parked
in his garage, which adjoined his house.177 The District Court’s
rationale was that the remaining location data was admissible
because “[a] person traveling in an automobile on public
thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his
movements from one place to another.”178 The Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia later reversed Jones’ conviction because
of the warrantless use of the GPS tracker.179
Justice Scalia authored the Jones opinion, which starts out in
a straightforward manner, holding that the government, in placing
the tracking device on Jones’ car, “physically occupied private
property.”180 That action alone constituted a search, as did the
subsequent use of the device to monitor the vehicle’s location.181
But through concurring opinions by Justice Alito (joined by three
justices) and by Justice Sotomayor, arguably there are two
majority opinions; Scalia’s opinion of the Court and the
combination of the two concurring opinions, which garnered five
justices’ support.
The issue that divided the Court was to what extent and how
the original intent of Fourth Amendment protections applies
today. To the majority, eighteenth century guarantees against
unreasonable searches “must provide at a minimum the degree of

175. See id. (“The Government ultimately obtained a multiple-count
indictment charging Jones and several alleged co-conspirators with, as relevant
here, conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute five kilograms
or more of cocaine and 50 grams or more of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§§ 841 and 846.”).
176. Id.
177. See id. (relating the procedural history that led to the casing coming
before the Supreme Court).
178. Id. (quoting United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983)).
179. See id. at 949 (explaining that the appellate court found that the
government actions violated the Fourth Amendment and refused an en banc
hearing of the case).
180. Id. at 949.
181. See id. (“We have no doubt that such a physical intrusion would have
been considered a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when
it was adopted.”).
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protection [they] afforded when it was adopted.”182 Under this
approach, basic trespass concepts seem to make Jones an easy
decision for the majority, though Justice Alito calls the inquiry into
question.183 But under the majority’s view, the government
occupied Jones’ property outside the scope and terms of the
warrant.184 Under that formulation, one need not reach whether
Jones had a reasonable expectation of privacy under Katz.185
The majority recognized that continuous surveillance without
an accompanying trespass would raise a difficult constitutional
question.186 The majority noted that such circumstances may
amount to an “unconstitutional invasion of privacy, but the present
case does not require us to answer that question.”187 But the
majority added that “situations involving merely the transmission
of electronic signals without trespass would remain subject to Katz
analysis.”188
In a sense, the majority opinion looked retrospectively and
addressed the case and facts presented, while the concurring
opinions looked prospectively at what is inevitably heading the
Courts way: technologically-enabled unmanned surveillance
without a trespass through law enforcement UAS.
Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence contended that “[i]n cases of
other novel modes of surveillance that do not depend on a physical
invasion on property, the majority’s trespassory test may provide
little guidance.”189 She then explained how GPS tracking data
“generates a precise, comprehensive record of a person’s public
movements that reflects a wealth of detail about her familiar,
182. Id. at 953.
183. See United States v. Jones 132 S. Ct. 945, 958 (2012) (Alito, J.
concurring) (criticizing the majority’s approach as “unwise” and stating that “it
strains the language of the Fourth Amendment; it has little if any support in
current Fourth Amendment case law; and it is highly artificial”).
184. See id. at 948 (explaining that police failed to comply with the warrant’s
directives in regard to time and geographic location).
185. See id. at 950 (stating that “we need not address the Government's
contentions, because Jones's Fourth Amendment rights do not rise or fall with
the Katz formulation”).
186. See id. at 954 (responding to the concurrences’ focus on the expectation
of privacy implications of the surveillance of Jones).
187. Id.
188. Id. at 953.
189. Id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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political, professional, religious and sexual associations.”190 And
the result, according to Justice Sotomayor is that “[a]wareness that
the Government may be watching chills associational and
expressive freedoms” and ultimately “alter[s] the relationship
between citizen and government in a way that is inimical to
democratic society.”191
Justice Alito contended that the majority holding was “unwise.
It strains the language of the Fourth Amendment; it has little if
any support in current Fourth Amendment case law; and it is
highly artificial.”192 Justice Alito highlighted how the majority
“makes very little effort to explain how the attachment or use of
the GPS device” constituted an unreasonable search.193 He then
disaggregated the installation of the device from the use, claiming
that it could only be the use which constitutes a search.194
In explaining why the Court should have “ask[ed] whether
[Jones’] reasonable expectations or privacy were violated by the
long term monitoring of the movements of the vehicle he drove,”
Justice Alito argued that the majority’s focus is backwards.195 This
is because, in Alito’s view,
the Court’s reasoning largely disregards what is really
important (the use of the a GPS for the purpose of long-term
tracking) and instead attaches great significance to something
that most would view as relatively minor (attaching to the
bottom of a car a small, light object that does not in any way
interfere with the car’s operation).196

Clearly Justice Alito, while critiquing the majority’s reasoning
in Jones, was concerned about how the Court will address the
inevitable, long-term government surveillance which does not
involve a physical trespass.197 He listed a host of devices which
190. Id.
191. Id. at 956 (quoting United States v. Cuevas-Perez, 640 F.3d 272, 285 (7th
Cir. 2011) (Flaum, J. concurring)).
192. Id. at 958 (Alito, J., concurring).
193. Id.
194. See id. (“It is clear that the attachment of the GPS device was not itself
a search; if the device had not functioned or if the officers had not used it, no
information would have been obtained.”).
195. Id. at 958.
196. Id. at 961 (emphasis in original).
197. See id at 961–63 (discussing developments in technology which allow for
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monitor a person’s movements: closed-circuit television, automatic
roadway tolls, roadside assistance services, and the ubiquitous
nature of cell phones and other wireless devices.198 To that list we
can of course add UAS.
To Alito and three other Justices, “[S]ociety’s expectation has
been that law enforcement agents and others would not—and
indeed, in the main, simply could not—secretly monitor and
catalog every single movement of an individual’s car for a very long
period.”199 At the time Jones was decided, however, the technology
made “long term monitoring relatively easy and cheap.”200 Justice
Alito claimed an inability to “identify with precision the point at
which the tracking of this vehicle became a search, for the line was
surely crossed before the 4-week mark.”201
B. Applying the Technology Cases to UAS
While there have been additional decisions which inform the
Supreme Court’s views on technology and surveillance in

law enforcement to implement comprehensive levels of surveillance which would
have previously been constrained by practical limitations such as manpower).
198. See id. at 963 (“The availability and use of these and other new devices
will continue to shape the average person's expectations about the privacy of his
or her daily movements.”).
199. Id. at 964. Law enforcement agents could have placed Jones under
human surveillance for the 28 days, staking out his residence and work place
when he was there and following him when he drove. And such surveillance would
presumably have yielded the same information as that provided by the GPS
device. But as Justice Alito notes, such surveillance would have been “difficult
and costly and therefore rarely undertaken.” Id. at 963.
200. Id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring).
201. Id. (emphasis added).
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criminal202 and civil contexts,203 Kyllo and Jones provide crucial,
additional clues to those offered by the surveillance trilogy cases.
First, under Kyllo it would seem that law enforcement could not
utilize UAS equipped with thermal sensors akin to those in Kyllo,
which allow for capturing images and information otherwise not
available without a physical intrusion.204 The one caveat is that the
Court conditioned its ruling on such technology not being generally
available.205 Some may argue that the same reasoning would
202. One such decision is Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013), decided
a little more than a year after Jones. Jardines dealt with police use of a dog
trained to detect narcotics on Jardines’ porch. Id. at 1413. Justice Scalia authored
the majority opinion and based the opinion on property aspects; specifically, that
police (and their dog) physically intruded on Jardines’ home. Id. at 1417. Justice
Kagan stated in a concurring opinion that she “could just as happily have decided
[the case] by looking to Jardines’ privacy interests.” Id. at 1418. Justice Alito’s
dissent, which three justices joined, claimed both were incorrect. See id. at 1420–
22 (arguing that trespass law did not support the Court’s opinion and that there
was no reasonable privacy interest because is customary for members of the
public to approach private homes from the driveway). While Jardines’ various
opinions reference Katz and Kyllo, among other cases, Jardines does not provide
much insight beyond what was previously known: Justice Scalia looks to property
or trespass issues where possible while Justice Alito disagrees with the propertybased approach.
203. In Grady v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 1368 (2015), the Supreme Court
addressed GPS monitoring of a sexual offender for the duration of his natural life.
The Court applied Jones, holding that a State “conducts a search when it attaches
a device to a person’s body, without consent, for the purpose of tracking that
individual’s movements.” Id. at 1370. A notable aspect of Grady is that North
Carolina’s sexual offender monitoring program was civil in nature but still fell
within the ambit of the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 1371 (noting that it is well
settled that Fourth Amendment protections extend beyond criminal
investigations). The North Carolina Court of Appeals had relied on the monitoring
program’s civil nature to determine its use did not constitute a search. See id.
(“[T]he North Carolina Court of Appeals apparently placed decisive weight on the
fact that the State’s monitoring program is civil in nature.”). The Supreme Court
found that the monitoring did constitute a search. See id. (finding that the State’s
program was designed to obtain information by physically intruding on a subject’s
body). The Court stated that whether or not the monitoring was unconstitutional
depended on whether the search was unreasonable. See id. (“The Fourth
Amendment prohibits only unreasonable searches.”). Because there was nothing
in the record regarding the reasonableness of the search, the Court vacated the
Court of Appeal’s ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings. See id.
(noting that the state courts had not examined whether the search was
reasonable).
204. See supra notes 167–170 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s
holding in Kyllo).
205. See supra note 168 and accompanying text (discussing the significance of
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prompt a different outcome in Kyllo if considered today due to the
general availability of heat sensors. Such a result would eviscerate
the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court will, or at least
should, clarify the role of general availability and presumptive, as
opposed to actual use as they relate to privacy expectations. Yet
presumably, what the Court is really saying in Kyllo206 is that
unless and until society accepts as a behavioral norm the looking
or sensing through the walls of others' homes—an unlikely event—
the interior of the home will remain entitled to protection from
government surveillance to obtain information which could
otherwise be obtained only by a physical intrusion.207
Second, Jones at least partially answers the question of
whether law enforcement could employ a UAS to continuously
conduct surveillance over a person, place, or object.208 Per Justice
Alito and three other justices, we know that within twenty-eight
days such continuous warrantless surveillance would constitute a
search.209 Given that current UAS are piloted from the ground,
such continuous surveillance seems unlikely for the same reasons
that it was unlikely that police officers would have chosen to
physically follow Jones around.210 We can probably expect to see
more continuous UAS use when the systems become autonomous,
and could be programmed to loiter over a house, or follow a car.
This Part’s consideration of the aircraft surveillance trilogy and
selected technology cases provides a sufficient framework to
consider states’ ongoing efforts to allow but regulate law
enforcement UAS use.

the fact that the thermal sensors used in Kyllo were not generally available).
206. The Court in Kyllo was also trying to square the circle it created with the
general availability concept in the aerial surveillance trilogy.
207. See supra note 164 and accompanying text (discussing language in Kyllo
regarding important privacy interests inside the home). Whether or not Justice
Scalia will argue “constructive trespass” in accord with his property/trespass view
remains to be seen.
208. See supra notes 182–187 and accompanying text (discussing the majority
opinion in Jones).
209. See supra note 181 and accompanying text (discussing Alito’s concurring
opinion in Jones).
210. Id.
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VII. State Experiments

As discussed at the outset, fourteen states have enacted laws
that allow law enforcement use of UAS.211 While all states will
inevitably pass such legislation, these fourteen states’ laws
constitute the current “labs of federalism.” Through these laws we
gain an appreciation of the varied interests and concerns in
different parts of the United States.
A. What They Do and What They Do Not Do
States’ legislation provides interesting comparisons of the
utility of different legislative approaches. One approach makes law
enforcement’s use of UAS the baseline, subject to limitation, while
another approach prohibits UAS subject to exceptions allowing
their use.212 While the approaches can lead to the same outcome,
the default setting of either permitting or restricting is significant.
In some cases a baseline of prohibiting UAS is the most likely
reason that law enforcement does not employ UAS to document
crime or accident scenes, despite being able to utilize UAS in other
ways. In the long run, assuming that UAS technology indeed
becomes ubiquitous, the likely outcome is that society will identify
law enforcement uses with which it is uncomfortable while
allowing all other uses. But for now, there is a broad array of
approaches to consider.
B. Definitions

211. See supra note 2 (listing Alaska, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa,
Louisiana, Montana, North Carolina, Oregon, Tennessee, Texas, Utah and
Wisconsin as states that have allowed law enforcement use of UAS technology).
In 2013, Virginia adopted a two-year moratorium on the law enforcement UAS
use. See supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. and accompanying text
(discussing the moratorium).
212. Compare FLA. STAT. § 934.50 (2014) (providing that a “law enforcement
agency may not use a drone to gather evidence or other information” subject to
exceptions), with OR. REV. STAT. § 837.320 (2014) (allowing drone use as long as
“law enforcement agency has probable cause to believe that . . . exigent
circumstances exist”).
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As with all areas of the law, terms and definitions are
important. Indiana, for example, defines “unmanned aerial
vehicles” as “tracking devices,”213 while Wisconsin utilizes the term
“drone” and only regulates drones capable of recording images or
sound.214 Other states, Alaska for example, refer to UAS and define
them in the same manner as the FAA.215 As discussed at the outset
of this Article, these varied definitions will be problematic as
systems become more autonomous. Society (and the law) needs to
distinguish between remotely piloted and increasingly
autonomous systems.216
C. Limitations
A number of States’ laws do not allow law enforcement to use
UAS in what would be considered “open fields.”217 Nor do those
213. IND. CODE § 35-31.5-2-337.5 (2014) (defining “tracking device” to include
unmanned aerial vehicles). Iowa and Utah also use the term “unmanned aerial
vehicles” (UAV), but neither classifies them as tracking devices. See UTAH CODE
ANN. § 63G-18-102 (West 2015) (defining “unmanned aircraft system”); IOWA
CODE § 321.492B (2014) (prohibiting the use of unmanned aerial vehicles for
traffic law enforcement).
214. See WIS. STAT. § 175.55 (2014) (restricting the use of drones). Oregon’s
legislation clarifies that “drone does not include a model aircraft” based on a 2012
FAA definition of “model aircraft.” OR. REV. STAT. § 837.300 (2014) (defining
“drone”). While 2012 is relatively recent, the FAA currently considers model
aircraft as UAS as previously discussed. See supra note 46 and accompanying text
(discussing the FAA’s definitions of UAS).
215. ALASKA STAT. § 18.65.909(2) (2014) (defining “unmanned aircraft
system”). Idaho, Louisiana, and North Carolina also refer to UAS. See IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 21-213 (West 2015) (restricting the use of unmanned aircraft systems); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:337 (West 2015) (same); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-300.1 (West
2015) (same). Tennessee and Texas use the term “unmanned aircraft.” See TENN.
CODE ANN. § 39-13-901 (West 2015) (defining “unmanned aircraft”); TEXAS GOV’T
CODE § 423.007 (limiting the use of law enforcement use of unmanned aircraft).
216. See supra notes 45, 47 and accompanying text (discussing regulatory and
definitional concerns that may arise as UAS technology develops).
217. These states include Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Oregon, Tennessee and
Texas. See FLA. STAT. § 934.50 (2014) (limiting law enforcement’s use of drones);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 21-213 (West 2015) (restricting the use of unmanned aircraft
systems); ILL. COMP. STAT. 167/10 (2014) (restricting the use of drones); OR. REV.
STAT. § 837.310 (2014) (same); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-903 (West 2015)
(prohibiting the use of an “unmanned aircraft to capture an image of an individual
or privately owned real property”); TEXAS GOV’T CODE § 423.007 (limiting the use
of law enforcement use of unmanned aircraft).
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states allow law enforcement to use UAS to acquire information
about an individual or their property without their consent.218
Thus, while law enforcement would not need to ask for consent
under Ciraolo, Riley, or Dow to fly a fixed or rotary wing aircraft
over someone’s property, law enforcement would need consent to
conduct the exact same surveillance with a UAS.219 Some states do
not even allow law enforcement to take pictures of crime scenes, a
restriction that seems unlikely to last given large and/or remote
crime scenes or vehicle accidents.220 These are all activities that
police officers can and do already using other technologies (for
example, cameras), so the objection to conducting them via UAS is
not based in law.221 Alaska and Utah have enacted laws which
require a warrant before law enforcement may employ UAS, but
also allow such use in accordance with a judicially-created
exception to the warrant requirement.222
Several states’ UAS laws contain exceptions with wordings
that will likely prove problematic.223 The laws of Florida, Illinois,
North Carolina, and Tennessee all contain an exception by which
law enforcement could permissibly use UAS without a warrant to
counter a high risk of a terrorist attack if the Homeland Security

218. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-903 (West 2015) (making it a criminal
offense to use an “unmanned aircraft to capture an image of an individual”).
219. See supra Part V (discussing the “aerial surveillance trilogy” of Supreme
Court cases).
220. In Florida for example, “a law enforcement agency may not use a drone
to gather evidence or other information” and while there are exceptions to the
prohibition, crime or accident scenes are not included. FLA. STAT. § 934.50 (2014).
221. Moreover, UAS would likely conduct these tasks more cheaply, quickly,
effectively, and safely than police officers on the ground.
222. See ALASKA STAT. § 18.65.902 (2014) (requiring law enforcement to
obtain a warrant or act in accordance with a judicially recognized exception);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 63G-18-103 (West 2015) (same). This later point may well
become the next circular lap in Fourth Amendment inquiry. See Kyllo v. United
States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (acknowledging that trying to determine whether a
given expectation of privacy recognized by society “has often been criticized as
circular, and hence subjective and unpredictable”).
223. See infra notes 224–235 and accompanying text (discussing ambiguities
and vague terms in state laws).
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certifies the risk.224 But “high,” “risk,” and “terrorist attack” are
undefined.225
In similar fashion, Indiana’s law contains an unqualified
“exigent circumstances” exception.226 Oregon’s law predicates its
“exigent circumstances” exception on probable cause.227 And
Tennessee’s law allows for law enforcement UAS use to “search[]
for a fugitive.”228 Thus, all three states allow for law enforcement
UAS use while in pursuit of an individual suspected of committing
nothing more than a misdemeanor while restricting UAS use in
non-exigent or fleeing cases in which felony misconduct is
suspected.229
Wisconsin’s statute unfortunately demonstrates the
complications arising from current Fourth Amendment case law.230
Under that law, “[n]o Wisconsin law enforcement agency may use
a drone to gather evidence or other information in a criminal
investigation from or at a place where an individual has a
reasonable expectation of privacy without first obtaining a search
warrant.”231 While restrictive, the provision seems straightforward
enough. Until the next sentence, “[t]his subsection does not apply
to the use of a drone in a public place . . . .”232 What then for the
224. See FLA. STAT. § 934.50 (2014) (listing exceptions to a warrant
requirement); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 167/15 (2014) (same); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A300.1 (West 2015) (same); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-609 (West 2015) (same).
225. See supra note 224 and accompanying text (gathering statutes that allow
law enforcement use of UAS when there is a credible risk of terrorist activities,
but not defining specific terms).
226. See IND. CODE § 35-33-5-9 (2014) (allowing UAS use when required due
to “the existence of exigent circumstances necessitating a warrantless search”).
227. See OR. REV. STAT. § 837.320 (2014) (allowing drone use when a “law
enforcement agency has probable cause to believe that . . . exigent circumstances
exist”).
228. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-609 (West 2015) (allowing UAS use “when
law enforcement is searching for a fugitive or escapee or is monitoring a hostage
situation”).
229. See supra notes 227–228 and accompanying text (collecting statutes).
The exceptions to the Texas prohibition on law enforcement UAS use specifically
exclude misdemeanors. See TEX. GOV’T CODE § 423.002 (2014) (allowing UAS use
for some law enforcement purposes, but not for “misdemeanors or offenses
punishable by a fine only”).
230. See WIS. STAT. § 175.55 (2014) (restricting the use of drones).
231. Id.
232. Id.
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camera-equipped law enforcement UAS operating at 400 feet, in
public airspace, over someone’s home?
Idaho’s law excepts out much of what otherwise could have
been its signaling function in terms of how people in Iowa view law
enforcement surveillance and privacy.233 The law is on one hand
restrictive, requiring a warrant before any state entity may use a
UAS.234 The law provides for the common exceptions of emergency
response for safety and search and rescue but also creates an
exception for controlled substance investigations.235 Excepting out
controlled substance investigations from the warrant requirement
is significant. Consider that two of the aircraft surveillance trilogy
cases and both technology cases involved controlled substance
investigations.
The states’ efforts in regulating law enforcement UAS use
seem ineffectual towards any goal other than being able to claim
to the electorate and media to have “taken action.” They regulate
but one category of unmanned systems capable of surveillance
when three exist.236 Likely due in part to their reactionary nature,
the laws employ undefined and even contradictory terms.237 It
would be one thing if these laws merely decreased law enforcement
efficiency, which to some may be a desirable goal. But these laws
decrease law enforcement efficiency while, at the same time,
failing to advance citizens’ privacy interests.
If a case reaches the Supreme Court it will likely be as the
result of the poor drafting of the law or its exceptions rather than
a deliberate effort by a State to mark out its views towards if and
how technology is altering the balance between privacy and law
enforcement. While on the whole this first round of state lab
experiments is not yielding useful results, other ideas in different
states bear watching.
233. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 21-213 (West 2015) (defining and restricting the
use of unmanned aircraft systems).
234. See id. (“Absent a warrant, and except for emergency response for safety
search and rescue or controlled substance investigations, no person, entity or
state agency shall use an unmanned aircraft system to intentionally conduct
surveillance . . . .”).
235. Id.
236. See supra notes 59–60 and accompanying text (noting ground and
maritime variants of unmanned surveillance systems apart from aerial systems).
237. See supra notes 225–238 and accompanying text (discussing ambiguities
and vague terms in state laws).
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D. A Single Courageous State?
An interesting proposal in Connecticut attempts to maximize
the potential of law enforcement UAS use while balancing against
the concern that at some point continuous surveillance itself might
constitute a search and violate constitutional privacy rights.238 The
Connecticut General Assembly’s Legislative Program Review and
Investigations Office issued findings and recommendations on
“drone use regulation” in December 2014.239 They proposed that:
The use of drones by Connecticut law enforcement agencies for
surveillance of a specific individual or a privately-held property
is prohibited except with the person or property owner’s consent
or when the duration of such drone-based surveillance is limited
to the following conditions:
Drone-based surveillance of a specific individual or a privatelyheld property:
1. without reasonable suspicion, shall be limited to 30
minutes total cumulative duration within a 30-day time
period
2. with reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, but without
the combination of probable cause and a valid warrant, shall
be limited to 24 hours total cumulative duration within a 30day cumulative time period; and
3. with probable cause and a valid warrant, shall be limited to
the terms of the warrant
A person or privately-held property shall not be considered the
target of such surveillance unless the person or property is
identifiable via the drone’s imagine or other informationgathering device or is otherwise acknowledge as the intended
target of such surveillance.240

While not law, at least not yet, this is the only proposal that
attempts to identify the bounds of societal expectations of
reasonableness in terms of privacy from law enforcement
238. See CONN. GEN. ASSEMBLY LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM REVIEW &
INVESTIGATIONS COMM., STAFF FINDINGS & PROPOSED RECOMMENDATIONS: DRONE
USE REGULATION (2014) (reporting expected advantages and disadvantages of law
enforcement UAS use in Connecticut).
239. Id.
240. Id. at 27.
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surveillance not accompanied by a trespass.241 It utilizes a sliding
scale linking the amount of permissible UAS surveillance to the
quantum and type of suspicion of wrongdoing. And it reflects both
the majority and Justice Alito’s concurring opinion in Jones that at
a certain point constant warrantless law enforcement surveillance
may well violate our constitutional right to privacy.242 This
proposal, were it to become law in Connecticut or elsewhere, might
amount to the novel social experiment Justice Brandeis called for.
And such a law, if (and when) challenged, would provide a useful
vehicle by and through which the state and federal judiciary could
consider the Fourth Amendment and government surveillance not
accompanied by a trespass.
VIII. Conclusion
Each technological advancement in our modern society, from
automobile to wiretap, fingerprint to DNA, has yielded concerns
about the corresponding increase in law enforcement capabilities
and, in turn, what that means for civil liberties.243 And with each
advancement balance is restored, if it was ever lost, in the
relationship between the individual and government. It is restored
as the result of open discussion and deliberative legislative
processes.244
The downside to the current state efforts to legislate law
enforcement UAS use is that we are sacrificing law enforcement
efficiency, which comes with a real—albeit hard to quantify—

241. See generally RICHARD M. THOMPSON II, CONG. RES. SERV., DRONES IN
DOMESTIC SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS: FOURTH AMENDMENT IMPLICATIONS AND
LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES (2013) (analyzing the legality of the use of drones under
the Fourth Amendment). In the end, determining “reasonableness” is perhaps the
most important inquiry in the Fourth Amendment analysis. See Peter Swire, A
Reasonableness Approach to Searches After the Jones GPS Tracking Case, 64
STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 57, 58, (2012) (discussing the test for reasonableness in
Fourth Amendment cases involving recent technology).
242. See supra note 201 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Alito’s
concurring opinion in Jones).
243. See supra Part VI (discussing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and
advances in technology).
244. Id.
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societal cost.245 Where we limit law enforcement, as indeed we
should, the limitations must be deliberate, not accidental.
The upside to these efforts is that they are likely well within
the bounds of Fourth Amendment. There is considerable room (and
need) for states to continue to experiment with protecting privacy
while providing security. Equipoise may be only aspirational, but
we can do more and be better at seeking a balance. In the words of
Irish writer Samuel Beckett: “Ever tried. Ever failed. No matter.
Try again. Fail again. Fail better.”246

245. See supra notes 225–239 (discussing problematic language and
restrictions in current statutes regulating law enforcement use of UAS).
246. SAMUEL BECKETT, WORSTWARD HO 1 (1983) (emphasis added).

